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The number and complexity of extravehicular activities (EVAs) required for the 
completion and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS) is unprecedented. The 
training required to successfully complete this magnitude of space walks presents a real risk 
of overuse musculoskeletal injuries to the EVA crew population. There was mounting 
evidence raised by crewmembers, trainers, and pbsicians at the Johnson Space Center 
(JSC) between 1999 and 2002 that suggested a link between training in the Neutral - 
Buoyancy Lab (NBL) and the several reported cases of shoulder injuries. The short- and 
long-term health consequences of shoulder injury to astronauts in training as well as the 
potential mission impact associated with surgical intervention to assigned EVA crew point to 
this as a critical problem that must be mitigated. Thus, a multi-directorate tiger team was 
formed in December of 2002 led by the EVA Office and Astronaut Office a t  the JSC. The 
primary objectives of this Tiger Team were to evaluate the prevalence of these injuries and 
substantiate the relationship to training in the NBL with the crewperson operating in the 
EVA Mobility Unit (EMU). Between December 2002 and June of 2003 the team collected 
data, surveyed crewmembers, consulted with a variety of physicians, and performed tests. 
The results of this effort were combined with the vast knowledge and experience of the Tiger 
Team members to formulate several findings and over fifty recommendations. This paper 
summarizes those findings and recommendations as well as the process by which these were 
determined. The Tiger Team concluded that training in the NBL was directly linked to 
several major and minor shoulder injuries that had occurred. With the assistance of JSC 
flight surgeons, outside consultants, and the lead crewmember/physician on the team, the 
mechanisms of injury were determined. These mechanisms were then linked to specific 
aspects of the hardware design, operational techniques, and the training environment. 
During the 1999 to 2003 time frame many variables converged to make it impossible to 
determine with any accuracy which one or two root causes were primarily involved. 
Therefore a broad range of recommendations was established to prevent future injury to 
crewmembers training in the NBL in the near term. Many of these recommendations are 
lessons learned that are essentially timeless and therefore should be passed on to future EVA 
endeavors to ensure that hardware designs and operational techniques utilized in the future 
consider the demands of training on the human body here on earth. 
Nomenclature 
ASCR = Astronaut Strengthening, Conditioning and Rehabilitation (Team) 
EMU = Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit 
FMC = Flight Medical Clinic 
HUT = Hard Upper torso 
NBL = Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory (located at the Sonny Carter Training Center in Houston) 
* EMCT Program Manager, EVA Office, 2100 NASA Parkway I XA, Senior Member. ’ Astronaut, Crew Office, 6767 Route De 1’Aeroport 
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I. Introduction 
Key to the future of human space exploration is the ability for humans to leave the confhes of a spacecraft by 
donning a space suit. The capability to perform Extra-vehicular Activity (EVA) has allowed for humans to come 
into more intimate contact with their surroundings (such as exploring the surface of the moon) as well as aiding the 
assembly and maintenance of large space structures and satellites. A vast majority of the EVAs performed today are 
in support of the assembly and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS). These EVAs are performed in 
most current configuration of the United State’s space suit called the Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit or the EMU. 
Between 1999 and 2003 (5 years), 39 EVAs were performed in the EMU, which is considerable when compared to a 
total count of 42 performed in the previous 18 years (1981 through 1998) of the Space Shuttle Program. In addition 
to the increase in quantity of EVAs, the complexity of these EVAs has also risen tremendously. 
Commensurate with the increased EVA requirements (quantity and complexity) is the increased need for training 
and preparation. The training required to perform an EVA includes a significant amount of time obtain experience in 
the EMU. Suit experience is gained by donning training versions of the suit (ufsually downgraded flight EMUS) and 
performing simulation runs in the NBL. The NBL is essentially an extremely large swimming pool in which up tc 5 
suited crewmembers may experience a real time simulation of the space environment. The suited crewmembers are 
outfitted with weights to make them neutrally buoyant. Although suit is neutrally buoyant, the crewmember inside 
is not completely weightless and still contends with the effects of gravity (particularly if inverted) and the drag of 
the water while translating. 
and the Space Shuttle) are placed in the pool to support the simulation of EVA tasks. Astronauts utilize the NBL to 
gain familiarization with the suit, the specific task at hand, and overall “weightless” environment. Performing an 
EVA in the EMU on-orbit can be a demanding physical task as substantiated by many experienced EVA veterans. 
Performing a simulation in the NBL can be even more demanding given the physics of the situation with increased 
suit torque and gravitational issues to be contended with. 
Life-size mockups with hi-fidelity EVA interface hardware (inclLZng ISS elementc 
An EVA crewmember selected for a mission requiring an EVA typically performs between 10 and 15 six-hour 
practice exercises in the NBL. This means, for example, that for a Shuttle mission with 3 scheduled EVAs, each 
crewmember must perform at least 30 NBL runs in a time span of about 18 months. Concurrent with the peak in 
EVA training activities in 1999, issues with astronaut injuries began to surface. It was not until 2002 that enough 
evidence accumulated to suggest a link between EVA training and occurrence of major injuries with crewmembers. 
Most serious of the injury concerns were those requiring surgical intervention. It was at this time that at least two 
experienced EVA crewmembers who had recently completed missions had elected to have surgery to repair shoulder 
issues. With the evidence suggesting a link between EVA training and shoulder injury and the potential severity of 
some of these injuries the representatives for the Astronaut Office and the EVA Office promptly decided to charter a 
tiger team to investigate this possible link. This team was dubbed the “Shoulder Injury Tiger Team” and 
investigated this issue between December 2002 and June 2003. The detailed results of the Tiger Team were 
published in a NASA Technical Memorandum in June of 2003 titled “EMU Shoulder Injury Tiger Team Report” ’. 
The focus of this paper will be to summarize the pertinent findings and recommendations that should be carried 
forward into fbture EVA and human space flight endeavors. These have been broken down into three categories, 
those that focus on the technical aspects of the issue, those that are related to health and medical monitoring, and 
those that focus on the cultural and organizational aspects. This paper will focus on a subset of the findings and 
recommendations in all three categories that may be beneficial to a wider audience. This paper will not replay the 
engineering and medical analysis used to develop more specific recommendations intended for a much more limited 
audience. That information can be found in the in the technical manual cited above and in the reference. It is the 
hope of the authors that this assessment represents one of the more significant chapters in the book of lessons 
learned in assembling and maintaining the International Space Station. Integrating humans and machines for the 
purposes of space exploration can and potentially will have a permanent affect on the health of future explorers. It is 
our intent here to communicate the lessons learned to future leaders of human space flight programs. 
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11. Investigation Process and Key Findings 
To address this issue a Tiger Team was established whose charter was to investigate the shoulder injury claims, 
determine if there indeed was a link between training for EVA missions and, if a link was established, determine a 
course for corrective action. This team was co-chaired by the authors, who represent the EVA Office and Crew 
Office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC). The team was comprised of representatives from several organizations at 
JSC including the Mission Operations Directorate, the Flight Medicine Clinic, the Space and Life Sciences Division 
(including Anthropometric - Biomechanic Facility and the Astronaut Strength, Conditioning and Rehabilitition 
office) and the Engineering Directorate. (Refer to the acknowledgment section for a detailed listing) In addition, 
several experts in the field of orthopedics and sports medicine were consulted. The team broke up into four 
subgroups to address this issue in a parallel fashion. These subgroups were Injury SurveyPost-dive Symptoms; 
Anthropometrics, Biomechanics and Suit Design; Conditioning and Rehabilitation Medicine; and EVA 
Skills/Mission Training. However, before each team could adequately examine this issue, the problem needed to be 
bounded. This required the collection of hard data. Since there was no one single reliable and current source for 
data injury data for crewmembers a survey was built and personally administered by Dr. Williams. Data was 
collected from 42 volunteer astronauts of the 104-member astronaut corps during the study. Because of time and 
logistics issues it was not possible to question the entire current cadre so the survey reflects a random selection of 
both EVA-experienced and non-EVA-experienced astronauts. Of the 42 astronauts interviewed, roughly half were 
considered EVA experienced (20). The survey collected various categories of data including subject baseline data 
(age, height, weight, etc.), EVA training experience, injury experience, and physical training habits. In addition, the 
survey asked the subjects for their personal opinion on causal mechanisms for injuries (if applicable) occurring 
during their mission training. 
~~ - ~~~ ___________ 
The results of the survey were quite enlightening and provided a backbone to many of the subsequent 
recommendations. The key findings from the survey are as follows: 
The physical demands of EVA training place the experienced EVA astronaut at increased risk of 
shoulder injury as the number of crew reporting shoulder pain during EVA training increased from 
astronaut candidates (0%) to contingency (1 l%), development runs (37%), EVA skills (45%) to mission 
assigned training (56%). 
Three of the astronauts in the study group have had surgery for shoulder injuries, however only two of 
these are considered EVA training-related, as the third astronaut had sustained shoulder injuries in a 
fall. Neither of the two cases of EVA training-related shoulder injury had a previous history of shoulder 
injuries prior to EVA training. 
The onset of shoulder pain during or within 24 hours of an NBL run strongly suggests a causal 
relationship in which some activity during the run precipitated the shoulder pain. Repeated episodes of 
shoulder pain during training suggest the evolution of overuse syndromes that could ultimately lead to 
lesions requiring surgical repair. 
Data was obtained on suspected causal mechanisms in 17 cases of EVA training-related shoulder pain 
(Refer to Table 2-6). In 8 of these cases, 22 multiple causes were listed in 7 different categories 
resulting in a total of 3 1 suspected causes. These are rank ordered in Table 1 below. 
0 
0 
Table 1 - Possible Causal Mechanisms 
EVA Crew % 
~~ 
InvertedPosition Suspected Cause: a 25.8% 
Planar HUT Suspected Cause: 7 22.6% 
Repetitive Motion: 6 19.4% 
Heavy Tools Suspected Cause: 5 16.1% 
Frequent NBL Runs: 2 6.5% 
Specific Arm Position: 2 6.5% 
EMU Donning: 1 3.2% 
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Although it cannot be irrefutably proven, the survey results presented a strong case in linking EVA training with 
the onset of various shoulder injuries among EVA crewmembers. The survey findings were crucial to the 
investigation but alone were not enough to adequately address this issue. Dr. Williams, with the help of outside 
consultants, then established a classification of shoulder injury and educated the rest of the team on the 
biomechanical mechanisms for injury. Armed with the survey data and better understanding how shoulder injuries 
occur, each sub-team could then begin examining the protocols, procedures, hardware, and practices that might be 
linked to this issue. It should be noted here that at no time was there a “smoking gun” for the cause of shoulder 
injuries. This issue involved several variables and therefore a wide search for all the potential causes was required. 
Likewise, there would be many recommendations for corrective action. After several months of investigation the 
team had developed a long list of findings. In order for the reader to better understand the summarized findings a 
short background on the people, hardware and training are provided. It would be prohibitively long to characterize 
the detailed background and findings from each sub-team, including all the terminology and names used within the 
findings. Therefore only a short synopsis below has been provided to give the reader a flavor of the multi-faceted 
nature of this issue. A full description of these details is provided in the technical memorandum published by the 
Tiger Team’. 
People I Organizations: There are several organizations responsible for supporting and conducting EVA 
training at the Johnson Space Center. The EVA Office provides the EVA hardware requirements and has overall 
authority on mission planning. The Mission Operations Directorate is responsible for developing and implementing 
the tramng reqmed to pertorm an l5V A. ‘ T h n X X t e a m  representatives provid&czitimr@ymmrtphymaF 
tramers to support overall crewmeiiibmditioning. T h ~ ~ g ~ ~ e ~ ~ n ~ - ~ ~ e ~ t ~ r a ~ - p ~ ~ ~ e ~  snpportfodq$tznd- 
training hardware development. The Space and Life Sciences Directorate oversees Medical Operations, which 
provides the crew with dedicated Flight Surgeons, and the Anthropometric and Biomechanical Facility, which 
performs research and evaluation of flight equipment, procedures, and systems from the perspective of 
biomechanics, human performance, and ergonomics. 
Hardware: The hardware component that received the most attention in this investigation was the Hard Upper 
Torso, or HUT for short, which is part of the EMU (see Figure 1). The HUT is essentially a fiberglass shell that 
provides pressure retention and structural attachment points for the helmet, arms and waist and the Primary Life 
Support System (PLSS). The flight and training versions (those used in the NBL) are identical. Primary design 
drivers for a HUT were that it had to be adequately sized to provide efficient mobility and allow for ease of suit 
entry (don) and exit (doff) for the crewman. Today three sizes of HUTS exist to support the crew cadre: medium, 
large and extra large. Two HUT configurations were certified for the Shuttle Program. These are referred to as the 
Pivoted HUT and the Planar HUT. The Pivoted HUT was the original design but was phased out between 1997 and 
2000 when the Planar HUT was put into service. 
The key difference between the two configurations is with the attachment design between the arm and the HUT. 
In the Pivoted HUT, the scye, or shoulder, bearing attached to gimbals allowing for rotation about 2 axes. The 
Planar HUT scye bearing is fixed and “pivot-less”. The Pivoted HUT performed extremely well since the gimbaled 
design allowed for an easier doddoff capability and enhanced overall mobility during operation. The gimbal design 
in the Pivoted HUT, however, was found to not be robust and represented a catastrophic hazard if it failed. 
Ultimately, a failure of a HUT pivot during a manned test led to the quick development of a replacement design, 
dubbed the Planar HUT. Without the gimbal pivot feature the scyes, or arm openings, in the Planar HUT were 
optimized to afford the greatest possible mobility without overly impairing the donning envelope. This compromise 
resulted in a decrease in overhead and downward reach in the Planar HUT. In addition, a Program decision was 
made during the design phase to accommodate all crewmembers in two sizes (medium and large) of Planar KuTs. 
This decision required minor, but important, dimensional changes to the HUT so that the Planar and Pivoted HUT 
sizes were no longer analogous. Later, a third size Planar HUT was added to the inventory to address fit issues 
associated with the crewmembers who fit in the Extra-Large Pivoted HUT. All of this historical information is 
pertinent since many of the current crew cadre were originally sized into Pivoted HUTS and trained in this design 
through the late 1990s prior to shifting over to the newer Planar design. 
4 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
Figure 1 - Planar HUT (left) and EMU 
without garment on the Planar HUT 
(?i Pht) 
The second hardware item that received attention of the team was EVA training tools. There are a wide variety 
of tools used for EVA operations. As such, many training versions of these tools are utilized in the NBL for 
practicing EVA tasks. Many of these tools have been modified to be neutrally buoyant in the water. However, a 
number of have not, and it was found that several commonly used tools were among the heaviest. Many of these 
tools weigh between 5 and 11 pounds in the water (buoyant weight). During NBL training it is sometimes necessary 
for the crewmember to be holding one of these tools with arms fully extended. This activity puts the crewmember’s 
shoulder under a high amount of stress. The duration of such an activity varied per task and the crewmember’s 
preference. 




Evaluate an EVA candidate’s skills with respect to EVA tasks and overall performance with suit 
mobility and translation 
Development of EVA tasks. Perform task feasibility, choreography, and fine tune timeline estimates 
Train EVA assigned crews on the mission tasks 
Although a comprehensive training program is established for EVA candidates, there is a certain amount of mentor 
training and “on the job” training. The Crew Office had recently established an ‘EVA Skills” training program 
aimed at providing prospective EVA candidates more opportunities to learn and demonstrate generic EVA skills. 
The initial NE3L exercises for a prospective EVA candidate were heavily task focused, meaning that there was little 
time set aside for suit familiarization and fundamentals of suit operation. Prior to this investigation, the first NBL 
experience for many candidates was considered a “weeding out” as opposed ensuring new candidates obtained 
optimum suit sizing, proper weigh out (achieving neutral buoyancy), familiarization with the NBL environment and 
other basics necessary to ensure success. 
Another key operational variable is the optimum work envelope. EVA compatible hardware (Le. worksites on 
the ISS, on-orbit replaceable units, tools) should be designed to allow the crewmember to work in a comfortable 
work envelope. Ultimately, for many missions this was not feasible because of either inadequate review of the 
original worksite design or changes to the worksite. There are several vital tasks that were performed on the Hubble 
Space Telescope and ISS that required crews to extend multiple times outside of the optimum work envelope as 
depicted in Figure 1. Performing such a task once or twice in orbit is not generally an issue. But repeatedly 
performing tasks outside of the envelope in the NBL, in a gravity environment, can be significant. The crewperson 
is at times fighting the torque of their own arm weight, the weight of the tool, and the torque of the suit pressure 
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garment. For ISS and Hubble missions, training ratios for EVAs have ranged from 10 to 15 meaning that a 
crewmember may experience up to 30 runs in the NBL in an 18-month time frame. And during each run the 
crewmember may be repeating a questionable task multiple times. While necessary, the repetition of such 
physically demanding tasks during training provides an opportunity for overuse and repetitive stress injuries. 
95th% crewmembers 
optimal work envelope. 
To be used as the optimum 
one-handed work envelope. 




Origin at the 4-bolt pattern 
Figure 2 EMU Work Envelope (for reference only) 
Finally, another important aspect in NBL training is that crews are subjected to inversion for short durations. 
‘Inversion’ is defined as any time the body is oriented in a head down position greater than 45 degrees. Inversion 
for short durations can have multiple effects but the most significant with respect to this issue is the fact that the 
shoulders would bear the full weight of the body while inverted. Crewpersons were not provided a restraint within 
the suit to adequately and comfortably support the weight of the body’, so minor shoulder bruising was almost 
always experienced by crewmembers during N3L runs with more than a few seconds of inverted operations. The 
reason for inverted operation is that Space Station mock-ups, due to their size and configuration, cannot be easily 
rotatedmaneuvered during or between training runs. In order to practice the full choreography of an EVA mission, 
the crewmembers must sometimes remain inverted for minutes at a time. 
Table 2 summarizes only those findings that led to recommendations that are more general in nature and 
therefore are appropriate for a lessons learned database. 
’ When the Pivoted HUT was originally designed, a shoulder harness, similar to those used on backpacks, was 
developed as an option to allow the crewmember to bear the weight of the EMU on his shoulders during 1-G 
exercises. However, it did not find favor with early EVA crewmembers and it was removed from general use in 
favor of location-specific padding sewn on the crewmember’s cooling garment, and padding became the de facto 
standard for addressing pressure points and comfort issues. Subsequent EVA crewmembers were unaware that the 
harness existed. 
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Table 2 - Significant Findings from the Investigation 
0 Sixty-four percent (14/22) of the surveyed EVA astronauts had experienced some degree of 
shoulder pain that they attributed to EVA training in the EMU. 
The survey of EVA training-related shoulder injuries did not include all astronauts in EVA 
training. 
During the interviews wit& EVA astronauts, it became evident that training in the EMU may 
also result other types of injuries, including fingernail delamination, elbow pain, knee pain, 
foot pain, and peripheral nerve compression leading to transient loss of sensation in certain 
areas of the upper or lower extremity. 
0 ISS and Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Medical Operations Requirements Documents 
WORDS) (SSP5260 Rev. B and SSP 13956) state that conditioning programs will be available 
to all spaceflight crewmembers and shall be scheduled in three periods of two hours per week. 
Crew participation was not monitored. 
0 Athletic workouts supervised by athletic trainers result in fewer training-related injuries and 
better outcomes than unsupervised athletic training. 
Tlllrty percent (3/10) of the astronauts with preexisting shoulder injuries reported that they 
were made worse by training in the NBL. 
i-ThFTBB1S-Phhysicians havebegun questioning sxikdkcmbuulxecmtm-tbpdieinjmies 
~ ~ ~ d ~ ~ h ~ i ~ ~ a ~ ~ n a t ~ n - a n d - t ~ e ~ ~ n d u ~ a ~ o s t ~ i v e - - ~ ~ ~ s ~ ~ t - p o o k ~ d e  
with photo-documentation of injuries as required. However they did not participate in weekly 
“All Doc’s” meetings held at the Flight medical clinic. 
If a crewmember does have an issue they may seek help from an ASCR representative, the 
NBL physician or the flight surgeon. But all 3 may not know of a particular issue. 
0 The Flight Medical clinic did not have on-call orthopedic surgeon expertise available. 
Consultant orthopedic surgeons may or may not have had familiarity with the unique aspects 
of EVA training and mission operations 
Only recently have the NBL physicians and the ASCR representatives been able to access and 
input into the crewmember’s electronic medical records. 
0 The existing system for medical surveillance monitoring of injuries did not detect the problem 
of shoulder injuries sustained in astronaut EVA training. 
A protocol/forum for inter-directorate communication of medical issues associated with 
operation of the EMU did not exist. 
Data collected via the observational study to identify EMU suit-related symptoms experienced 
by all astronauts in training at the NBL has the additional benefit of providing immediate 
insight into issues as they develop. Feedback to the FMC will enhance awareness of the 
medical issues associated with EVA training 
There is no NASA-approved sizing document levied on the EMU processing contractors. The 
most recent revision (now obsolete) dqes not include the Planar HUT or Space Suit Assembly 
enhancements 
Differences exist in the way the EMU processing organizations take measurements. 
Measurements are recorded in inches per procedures used by the Crew and Thermal Systems 
Division while they are recorded in centimeters at United Space Alliance (USA)/FCE. 
0 There are numerous controlled dimensions in the design and manufacture of the HUT, but 
none are directly relatable to crewmember measurements currently recorded. Standardized 
landmark-based measurements may not be sufficient to size the HUT for the crewmember. 
Current EMU sizing techniques do not account for how the human body fills individual suit 
components. Current sizing is based on linear measurements. Instead, it should consider both 
linear and volumetric measurements to optimize suit fit. 
The suit sizing algorithm, which was developed for the Pivoted HUT two decades ago, does 
not include all relevant measurements for fitting the crew and does not reflect the sizing 
requirements for the Planar HUT. 
* Optimum I-G suit fit does not necessarily correlate with optimum 0-G suit fit. In microgravity, 











Suit Fit - 
Measurements 
Suit Fit - 
Sizing 
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0 The Planar HUT is the current flight-certified configuration of the EMU. To optimize suit fit to 
reduce the risk of shoulder injury, some astronauts prefer the option of training in the Pivoted 
HUT! non-flight-certified configuration. 
Inexperience with the shoulder harness for the last 14-15 years during NBL training means that 
astronauts, suit engineers, and technicians are unfamiliar with this hardware. 
Crewmembers are not adequately educated on different padding configurations available. They 
have not been aware of the option to use the harness within the HUT for the last 14-15 years. 
0 A formal review of padding design was not performed with the introduction of Planar HUTS. 
0 The Planar HUT design uses a standardized body seal closure and scye bearing size that are 
common to the Medium, Large, and Extra Large HUTS. The size of these components restricts 
doddoff and mobility envelopes, and can increase the risk of shoulder injuries in some 
crewmembers 
The Planar HUT shoulder design restricts the normal scapulothoracic motion of the shoulder 
joint, resulting in rotator cuff impingement in certain arm positions. 
0 The risk of EVA training-related shoulder injury can be reduced but not eliminated by 
redesigning the Planar HUT shoulder joint. 
0 NBL lesson plans did not specify the limits on tasks requiring inverted body orientations, use 
-heavy t o o l m e  n e e d ~ - o r i i i i i i i ~ E M U 3 m i % ~ o p e .  
0 Lesson Objectives fori5iti-L runs in A3C-AFEKA3aining were EiS&%Ei%%~PiWidiiig 
a functional fit check and assessments of an adequate weigh out were not formal initial lesson 
objectives . 
Certain hardware designs and tasks force crews to overextend their arms and perform duties 
outside of a nominal EMU work envelope. 
The NBL training ratio has historically exceeded 10 to 1. The maximum number of runs - 
typically performed by any one crewmember in a week is three 
Frequent use of heavy tools outside of the nominal work envelope in the NBL increase the risk 
of shoulder injury. 
0 There are no generic requirements with respect to buoyant tool weight for use in the NBL. 
111. Key Recommendations and Lessons Learned 
At the beginning of this investigation it was assumed that a single discrete root cause for the prevalence of 
shoulder injuries would not be found. As Table 2 illustrates there is a suite of variables that together in some 
combination could have led to each case of shoulder injury. To address this multi-factorial problem several specific 
recommendations would be necessary. Over 50 recommendations were ultimately published. Of those, 27 are 
directly applicable towards future EVA programs or are indirectly applicable to any human space flight program. 
As with the findings, the recommendations highlighted in this section are provided only at a summary level. These 
recommendations have been categorized into three areas, those that are primarily technical in nature, those that deal 
with medical monitoring, and those that pertain more to the organizational and cultural aspects of the EVA 
organizations at JSC. 
Before proceeding however the authors would like to make a few general statements on the recommendations 
provided by the Tiger Team. Subjectively there are a small group of these recommendations that would go a long 
way towards resolving this issue. These include redesign of the HUT, improving medical surveillance of the 
crewmembers, and improving the training and awareness of the crewmembers. A HUT redesign is problematic 
largely because of the fact that a redesign and fleet replacement would take several years. Over this same timeframe 
the bulk of the ISS assembly will be completed. This assembly will require thousands of hours in the NBL by 
several dozen crewmembers. In addition, a redesign of the HUT for the current configuration of the EMU was 
considered a large expenditure for a point solution. The authors recommended to JSC management that it would be 
more beneficial to spend the time and resources instead on starting efforts to ensure the next suit (planetary or low 
earth orbit) design would benefit from these lessons learned. The authors believe that instituting the remaining 
recommendations could reduce the risk of recurrence major injuries dramatically if not totally in a relatively short 
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time frame. The complete list of recommendations was assigned to directorate levels of authority at JSC to ensure 
closure andor future compliance. 
A. Technical recommendations for the Current Design 
This category of recommendations includes those that are more specific and technical in theme. These technical 
recommendations direct a specific corrective action but indirectly provide for Iessons learned. 
Develop a NASA integrated astronaut anthropometric database for sizing the EMU, the Advanced Crew 
Escape suit, and any other pressure or partial-pressure suit. 
At JSC there is more than one contractor or government lab maintaining anthropometric data on crewmembers. 
Each location has a specific need and may maintain quite different measurements and algorithms used for sizing. It 
was determined that the best practices for measuring and maintaining up to date anthropometric data should be 
consolidated and maintained by the Government. This data over time can prove to be useful for other studies where 
statistical data on average crewmember sizes is required. 
~ d ~ ~ ~ ~ i t ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ G c ~ ~ a ~ - e ~ ~ h ~ ~ a ~ ~ e ~ i z ~ ~ ~ ~ o n ~ a t i o n  in 0 G. Formallv assess other factors 
_ a f f e c t i n g s c r o - g r a y i ~ - . -  
Integral to sizing a crewmember correctly for on-orbit operations is the adjustment made for spinal elongation 
experienced from prolonged exposure 0-G. It was found that spinal elongation is neither well understood nor well- 
documented. Further, there is no medically accepted basis for the current values used by the several organizations 
responsible for sizing crewmembers for EMU other pressure suits. The Tiger Team deemed a formal study utilizing 
a majority of the future crewmembers assigned to flights necessary . 
Assess updating the primary work envelope as defined in NSTS 07700, Vol. XIV, Appendix 7 based on latest 
current suit fit and population. 
Update documentation (i.e. crew consensus form) to ensure evaluation of task and hardware during 
development NBL runs will include an assessment of the crewmember’s capability to perform the task within 
the specified work envelope. 
One of the top-level specifications at JSC for defining manned space fight requirements is NSTS 07700. This 
document contains an entire chapter on EVA requirements, including the definition of the EMU’S primary work 
envelope (similar to Figure 2). The version published in NSTS 07700 fails to address the changes that occurred with 
the introduction of the Planar HUT. In addition, the document is used as a guideline rather than a hard requirement 
to which spacecraft with EVA interfaces must comply. For example, several of the ISS and Hubble “EVA 
compatible” worksites force the crewmembers to work outside of this envelope, in some cases for extended periods 
of time. Maintaining up to date specifications and conforming to those is a practice that is difficult for most 
programs but is key to ensuring mission success and safety. 
Future NBL training tool development (all handheld tools) should require tools to be neutrally buoyant. This 
should be documented in the appropriate work instructions and/or general design requirements. 
As described in the findings, several of the hi-fidelity NBL tools are too heavy. In some cases the desire for hi- 
fidelity training aids leads to heavier and heavier tools with little thought to long-term consequences. Although 
some NBL tool designs were constructed to be neutrally buoyant, there was no global requirement levied on NBL 
tool designers as such. Requirements governing all training tools to be used by suited crewmembers in the NBL are 
being changed at this time. 
The HUT harness and Padding shall be redesigned 
The current suit configuration does have a HUT harness and padding designed to either relieve pressure poinis or 
isolate the crewmember from the pressure points entirely (Figure 3). The adequacy of the harness and padding had 
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not been formally evaluated since the original design of the Pivoted HUT. During transition to the Planar HUT and 
increasing frequency of training, some of this equipment began to be modified b a n  ad-hoc fashion. For example, 
thin strips of Teflon panels were added to the pads to address a “hot spot” or point load. The HUT harness (Figure 
3), although avdable, was not used by any of the current crewmembers. Ultimately, it was determined that 
reexamination and reengineering of these items was necessary. It appears that this portion of the suit design was 
given little to no thought over the years because it was deemed a crew comfort or preference item. In fact certain 
items like the HUT harness had been almost erased from the corporate memory of the program 
ADJUSTMENT 
SPANDEX 
Figure 3. Original HUT Harness 
Develop new suit sizing constraints, requirements, and processes. Re-institute the EMU Sizing Document 
(Class I controlled by NASA) and update it to reflect the latest configuration of space suit assembly 
hardware, suit sizing requirements and utiIition of laser scanning. 
The method by which suits have been sued was experimental at best in the beginning of the program. Sizing a 
suit had been reduced to an “art form” for some areas with this responsibility. NASA gave up controI of this process 
several years ago and left it up to the internal processes of each area performing this task. Based on the Tiger Team 
evaluation it was determined that additional rigor and control was required and, as such, put forth the above 
recommendation. 
B. Health and Surveillance 
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This next grouping of recommendations is related to the health and medical monitoring of the crewmembers in 
training. Even if the equipment and operations are designed to mitigate the potential for injury, it is the belief of the 
Tiger Team members that a rigorous monitoring program needs to be in place. Too many variables are outside of 
the control of the design and operations teams to ensure no injuries occur. Therefore, the next line of defense is to 
catch any potential serious injuries early. 
All astronauts at each stage of EVA trainiig must have an assessment with an ASCR to develop an 
individualized EVA workout. Astronauts should be referred to a designated athletic trainer or a physical 
therapist for a functional shoulder assessment a t  least four weeks prior to starting astronaut candidate 
(ASCAN) EVA training, EVA Skills training, and Mission-Specific EVA training. 
The NBL Physician will assess each astronaut following suited rum to evaluate possible overuse syndromes, 
injuries, and other medical issues in astronauts. They will arrange follow-up in the Flight Medical Clinic for 
individuals if clinically indicated. 
If clinically indicated, the NBL Physician and other physicians conducting medical evaluations of EVA crsw 
prior to NBL training will perform a history and physical examination to detect unresolved shoulder 
symptoms/in.juries. 
The NBL Physician will assess each astronaut following suited runs to evaluate possible overuse syndromes, 
injuries, and other medical issues in astronauts. They will arrange follow-up in the FMC for individuals if 
clinically indicated. 
____ 
A member of the ASCR team should perform a follow-up consultation with EVA crewmembers within 48 
hours of performing an NBL run. 
All of the above recommendations combine into one sentiment: constant surveillance of the health of EVA 
crewmembers in training is required. The Tiger Team truly believes that training in the NBL is a physically 
demanding task and there exists a high potential for minor injuries as a result. If left alone, some of these minor 
injuries could lead to serious issues. Consequently, the team recommended additional rigor and steps to improve 
and expand the current crewmember health surveillance program. However, the real lesson learned here is the 
importance of defining the responsibilities each organization has within this surveillance circle. Three separate 
groups (NBL Physicians, FMC doctors, and ASCRs) are independently and collectively crucial to ensuring the 
success of the surveillance program. It is imperative that these organizations understand where their responsibilities 
begin and end to most effectively undertake this collaborative effort. 
A retrospective study of all types of injuries associated with EVA training should be conducted 
This entire study hinged on the results from the survey. Without it many of the findings and recommendations 
could not be substantiated. Ultimately, it was the opinion of the Tiger Team that this type of data should always be 
available and periodically reviewed by the responsible parties. Without a data baseline several months were added 
to this investigation. New programs with intensive physical training programs need to ensure that some organization 
is maintaining pertinent metrics on trainee health and medical issues. 
Guidelines for allowable frequency of runs any one crewmember can perform in a week (or within a 
meaningful time period) should be developed and documented. Criteria for allowable frequency and 
duration of inverted training for EVA need to be established, documented, and implemented. These criteria 
should include minimum rest times between inverted sessions. 
EVA operations and training for the early Space Shuttle Program was much less frequent and much less 
challenging than that of today, which includes assembly for ISS, maintenance of Hubble and other activities. In the 
early days of the Shuttle Program, guidelines to protect the crew were most likely not considered necessary. With 
the progression to more complex programs requiring a magnitude more EVAs per year, guidelines like the two 
shown above are necessary. This is one of many areas where requirements creep placed more challenges on the 
crew, potentially pushing some to the point of serious injury. 
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heavier tools (cautions, hold time constraints), need for diver assistance, cautions to be expressed to crew to 
limit general overexertion and for specific tasks that are historically difficult. 
Astronauts in the early portion of their training should be provided with lessons learned from experienced 
crewmembers with respect to suit fit and operations in NBL. These lessons learned should be documented 
(Le. EVA Standard Operation Procedures). 
The above recommendations are in response to many of the findings that were concerned with training and risk 
awareness. A good defense against the recurrence of injuries is to properly train both the crew and individuals 
supporting the crew on the risks involved with the training. For the crew this means both physical conditioning 
(preventative training) and knowledge transfer. Many of the recommendations can be best summarized as raising 
awareness of the risks involved with training in the NBL with the current suit and tool designs. Much of the 
awareness training was simply passed on fiom one crewmember to another and from one NBL diver to another. 
Over time this type of knowledge transfer can become diluted and sometimes be forgotten altogether. This is why 
awareness training and physical training for the crew and support personnel must be documented and provided 
repeatedly and consistently. 
IV. Conclusion - Thoughts on Future EVA Suit Development and Beyond 
______-___ 
A primary lesson learned towards future suit development efforts is that a suit must be designed by the right 
expertise with both operational and training objectives in mind. The current EMU was designed fnst for near earth 
orbit applications and only modified slightly to ensure an effective training environment. The mantra for many 
years has been “train what you fly in”. Training in the NBL with flight-like gear has great advantages to both the 
crew and designers. For the crew, utilizing such a hi-fidelity trainer provides for a smooth, if not seamless, 
transition to actual flight experience. For the designer, utilizing flight-like hardware for NBL training provides an 
opportunity to acquire thousands of hours of operation in one year on a design that may only see a one to two 
hundred hours in space over several years. This opportunity provides a “wringing out” for the hardware and, in the 
case of the EMU, the NBL experience has been invaluable in early identification of design shortcomings. But these 
advantages need to be weighed against disadvantages of operating in a sub-optimal I-g design. A crewmember will 
spend an order of magnitude more time in a space suit on the ground than he/she will on-orbit. This amount of 
exposure to a particular design (and its I-g shortcomings) means future EMU and EVA tool engineers must design 
for training as well. 
Another key lesson is that biomechanical engineers, kinesiologists, and orthopedic specialists should participate 
during the preliminary design phase of future suit efforts to best optimize the suit fit fiom an ergonomic perspective. 
Additionally, laser anthropometric studies of male and female astronauts, biomechanical analysis of shoulder joint 
motion in both genders, use of CAD models of shoulder joint motion and EMU shoulder joint design should all be 
incorporated into the development of the next-generation space suit. 
As was witnessed by our experience with the E M ,  once hardware as critical and complicated as a space suit has 
been designed, certified and fabricated it becomes increasingly difficult - if not impossible - to make adjustments to 
improve the human to machine interface. This is especially true in the case of a space suit where the interfaces are 
fine-tuned to balance the needs of several competing requirements. Because of the high expense of the design, 
certification and implementation process for new hardware, NASA plans to continue to fly the existing EMU design 
to support Shuttle and ISS assembly operations for the next 8 years. Future suit designs must plan and allocate 
enough resources in the design phase to ensure a more “biomechanically friendly” suit, which allows for mobility 
within a nominal work envelope that will not obstruct normal human motion and not require increased strength and 
endurance to operate. Future suit designers must also attempt to broaden on the anthropometric range of the current 
suit. Finally, future programs must ensure that adequate requirements and processes are in place to address many of 
the other recommendations suggested in this paper in the areas of training, awareness, communication, crewmember 
conditioning, and medical surveillance. 
Finally many of the adverse findings in this study are the direct result of requirements creep and a slow 
disintegration of corporate memory. Leaders of future space flight programs with design lifetimes of 10 years or 
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more must strive to put in place controls for all critical processes and develop knowledge capture systems to ensure 
the rationale behind many of the early program decisions is maintained throughout the program history. Programs 
that put hardware in intimate contact with humans such as a space suit must have a broader definition of critical 
process or requirements because any slight change or variance can directly affect the crewmember’s long term 
health and safety. 
14 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
Acknowledgments 
The authors would like to acknowledge the extremely helpful efforts of several individuals who supported the 
original Tiger Team and provided their expertise towards a rather difficult issue. 
Mission Operations 
Crew Systems EC/Joe Kosmo 
Space Suit Assembly Subsystem 
Astronaut Office CB/Rex Walheim 
Human Factors (ABF) 
Flight Crew Engineering 
Flight Medicine 
Occupational Health / NBLPhysician 
and Rehabilitation Team 
DX/Mary Fitts, Zane Ney 
EC5/Scott Cupples 
SF3/Sudhakar Rajulu and Luis Gonzalez 
USA/FCE/Don Campbell, Lou Carfagno and Chris 
Trevino 
SD2/Joe Dervay, Rick McCluskey 
SD/Chuck Ross and Sam Strauss 
- -Astronaut Strengthening,Gonditioniag,--- SD/JamieChauvin,BethShepherd,- and-Gorey-Twine- - 
References 
‘Williams, D. R., and Johnson, B.J., “EMU Shoulder Injury Tiger Team Report,” NASA/TM-2003-212058,2003. 
15 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
c. Organizational / Cultural 
This final category of recommendations includes those that 
issues is a breakdown of communications at some level. Another 
community awareness of risks. It is crucial that all individua 
comprehensive training and awareness of those risks. 
on EMU-related medical events at the mL. 
Incorporate ASCR Assessments and Interventions into the 
symptoms and injuries. 
medical issues associated with operation of the EMU and 
Many of the findings suggested that overall communic 
above recommendations and others in the full report sugge 
training. 
The NBL Physician, Flight 
diagnosis, and treatment of 
\ 
run) including a functional fit check, constraints and information related to inverted operations, use of 
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